The opposition in Germany to the rise of National Socialism came from almost every section of society, including communists, socialists, conservatives and liberals, and took a number of different forms, ranging from passive resistance to open hostility to the regime. It is clear, however, that this opposition did not have the desired effect as the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (the Nazi Party) and its dictator Adolf Hitler came to power and created a totalitarian state with little difficulty and disastrous consequences. The failure of the resistance to Nazism can be attributed to a number of factors, such as isolation, inability to withstand Nazi repression and the unwillingness of different sections of the resistance to work together. It was most certainly the weakness of the opposition to National Socialism that ensured its success.
Leon Trotsky relates that in its ninth plenum in February 1928, the Executive Committee of the Third Communist International 'gave the signal for an intensified, extraordinary, irreconcilable struggle against 'social fascism.' The German Communist Party certainly did have the potential to organise such an opposition to National Socialism, however the struggle that eventuated certainly did not fit that description. After the German Communist Party was banned and their deputies expelled from the Reichstag in March of 1933, Communist opposition most often took the form of illegal publications published either within or outside of Germany and distributed widely. Members of the Communist resistance organised themselves into underground networks. Michael Thomsett recounts that 'cells of the underground contained only three people, trained to work together with absolute efficiency, with limited contact outside of the group itself.' This was known as the troika system. J. P. Stern speaks of Communist resistance in the form of 'industrial sabotage... [and] contact with foreign workers or prisoners of war,' and he puts their numbers in 'the ten thousands.'
Peter Hoffman notes that 'the Communist Party had long been in the forefront in preparing and arming for civil war against 'fascism.' Yet when 'fascism' came to power, nothing really significant was done.' There can be identified several reasons for why the only resistance the Communists offered came in the form of illegal publications and the formation of networks. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, as a member of the Third Communist International, the German Communist Party was controlled and directed by the Central Committee of the Stalinist Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Hoffman relates that it was the Central Committee's assessment that 'the advent of a fascist government should promote Germany's internal self-destruction and prepare the ground for a communist seizure of power.' It was also their analysis that the victory of fascism in Germany would cause the majority of the population to become disillusioned with bourgeois democracy, and thus withdraw their support from the Social Democratic Party of Germany (the occurrence of which the Communists felt was an integral stage in the proletarian revolution.) Hans Rothfels observes that the culmination of these opportunist assessments resulted in 'the phase of the Hitler-Stalin alliance (from August, 1939 to June, 1941) [that] brought the extremes considerably closer together even in internal politics. On instructions from Moscow, many Communist crossed over at that time to the National Socialist side.'
Moreover, the incredible repression the Communists suffered at the hands of the National Socialists made resistance difficult for those members of the Communist Party who refused to accept the Moscow party line. The Reichstag fire of February 28 1933 allowed the Nazi Party 'to take far sterner action against the communists than they had probably planned to do at this early stage of their rule.' Throughout 1933 and 1934, Thomsett reports, 'large numbers of communists were arrested and sentenced to prison in mass trials... for crimes such as listening to foreign radio broadcasts or distributing information described as 'seditious.'' As a result of this ruthless suppression, and the ensuing logistics of operating underground, Communist resisters were forced to deal with incredible isolation that further weakened their ability to oppose the Nazi regime. Gabriel Almond describes this isolation as 'an elementary principal of safety' and that because of it Communists only 'knew in general terms that other Communist groups and cells were operating in their area' and refers to 'the absence of any connection' between them.
A further explanation for the weakness of the opposition to National Socialism offered by the Communists was their unwillingness to work with the Social Democratic Party. Writing in 1933, Trotsky is damning in his criticism of the failure to form a united front against fascism. He proclaims that in the German Communist Party 'everything is wrong: the evaluation of the situation is incorrect, the immediate aim incorrectly posed, the means to achieve it incorrectly chosen.' Nothing other than the two anti-fascist organisations working together could win a victory against the Nazi Party. A victory Trotsky assessed was possible 'not after their coming to power, not after five, ten, or twenty years of their rule, but now.' Trotsky declared that 'it is necessary to show by deeds a complete readiness to make a bloc with the Social Democrats against the fascists in all cases in which they will accept a bloc.'
The attempts made by the German Communist Party to form a united front were half-hearted and doomed to failure. On July 21 1931 the Communists made a proposal for a united front which included certain restrictive conditions. These conditions were unacceptable to the Social Democratic Party, and as a result the Communists instead 'formed a united front with the fascists against Social Democracy.' In January 1933 another proposal was made which the Social Democratic Party was willing to consider, with the condition of a 'non-aggression pact' between the two organisations. The Communist Party refused. The Social Democratic Party repeated their offer to accept on February 12 1933, and was again refused. Jane Degras relates that Trotsky reacted with disgust to these events, claiming the offer 'should have been welcomed with open arms' and that the German Communist Party's conditions for the formation of a united front 'were for a united front with themselves.'
Further, when the Nazi Party finally rose to indisputable power, the German Communist Party attributed its rise to the Social Democrats, taking no responsibility themselves. Minutes of the Third Communist International explain Hitler's triumph as caused by the fact that 'German Social Democracy, which had the majority of the proletariat behind it in the November 1918 revolution, split the working class and, instead of driving the revolution forward to the proletarian dictatorship... allied itself with the bourgeoisie and the Wilhelmian generals to crush the rising of the revolutionary masses and opened the deep split in the working class.' Trotsky, however, points to the incorrect policy of the German Communist Party and claims 'its leaders had been blind.' He argues vehemently that 'fascism was assisted to power by the united efforts of the leaders of both the workers' parties.'
The response of the Social Democrats to the rise of National Socialism was in some ways similar to that of the Communists. The Social Democratic Party was banned on June 22 1933 and after this time also operated underground. Once again, the resistance that was organised was a shadow of what would have been possible given a different strategic approach, especially given the extensive support that the Social Democratic Party originally had among the working class. Opposition, when it did occur, manifested itself in 'a flood of illegal brochures and pamphlets.' Walter Schmedemann was the leader of the Social Democratic 'Eilbek Comrades' who produced a four-page flyer that at the height of its popularity had a circulation of 5,000. To accomplish a task of this magnitude each week in secret would obviously require extensive underground networks and the participation of many. Thomsett offers an idea of the extent of the opposition organised by the Social Democratic Party through relating the fact that 'by July 1933, German prison camps held 26,789 political prisoners [and] most of those were Social Democrats.' Further, Thomsett maintains that 'in the year 1936, another 11,687 were arrested and charged with working for the Social Democrats.'
Hoffman notes that the relative inactivity of the Social Democrats in opposing the rise of the Nazi Party was equal to that of the German Communist Party, 'but there was nothing new or unusual in their inactivity.' He correctly assesses that since the Social Democratic Party voted in favour of World War I in 1914, the nature of the Party was reformist and not revolutionary, which had a resounding impact on the type of struggle they were able, or willing, to organise. Hoffman points to 'a legalistic attitude of mind [that] was widespread and deep-rooted in the Party.' This is significant as National Socialism came to power in a so-called 'legal' and 'democratic' fashion, and not through a forceful coup d'etat, leaving the Social Democratic Party unable to oppose its legitimacy. Thus the Social Democrats remained passive, despite the urgings of the Reichsbanner (the militant wing of the Social Democrats) and clear signs that sections of the working class were ready and willing to act against National Socialism.
A further reason for the unwillingness of the Social Democratic Party to resist National Socialism in the early months of 1933 was the desire to protect itself. Unsure of the political situation and the support of the working class, and threatened by the prospect of being banned, the Social Democrats concluded that 'inactivity seemed to offer the only chance of survival.' This, in fact, was a response that the Nazi Party depended on. Instead of moving against all its opposition simultaneously, the National Socialist assessed that 'the more [the opposition groups] could be separated from one another, treated in isolation, and if possible, assaulted individually, while leaving the remainder in hope, the more helplessly they would have to surrender themselves to the wielders of power.' It was not until after the Party was banned that the Social Democrats began to organise themselves in opposition, but by this time they had lost a great deal of the confidence of the masses. After the ban, the Social Democratic Party faced severe repression in the same way as did the German Communist Party resulting in similar problems of isolation, the emigration of its leaders, and uncoordinated efforts.
Having witnessed the poor efforts of the Social Democratic Party to oppose National Socialism, many young socialists formed radical new groups and attempted to organise a militant and overt resistance. Rothfels describes one such group, led by a man who used the pen name 'Miles,' which was formed in the autumn of 1933. The group demanded unity among socialists and Communists, and assessed that it was impractical to wait for the fascist regime to collapse on its own. They instead proposed the task of immediately forming 'a secret and firmly cohesive organisation of experienced individuals who would have theoretical and practical schooling and maintain contact with important groups of industrial employees,' in order to overthrow National Socialism as soon as possible.
Resistance to National Socialism from the conservative sections of society was similarly weak, thoroughly individualised, lacked unity, and failed to understand the danger presented by the Nazi Party from the outset, thus waiting too long to organise an opposition. Conservative elements held strong illusions in the parliamentary system, and believed that the government of January 30 1933 could be controlled by the 'checks and balances' of the system. Once it was clear that this was not the case, the Catholic Church, the army, and the civil service did begin to passively or openly resist.
The opposition to Nazism that came from the Catholic Church was entirely passive, but they were, as Hoffman argues, 'the only organizations to produce some form of a popular movement against the Nazi regime.' Fabian von Schlabrendorff testifies to this, recalling that his own reasons for opposing sprung from 'the moral and ethical concepts taught by the Christian faith.' He also assesses that 'opposition to Hitler began, then, not as an organized political movement but as the reactions of individuals with religious and moral convictions.'
The Catholic Church was incited to protest in particular by the first sterilization law that was introduced by the Nazi Party in the summer of 1933. Similar to the Communists and socialists, the Catholic Church's opposition most often took the form of publications. The Catholic Rhatin group was formed in 1933 and produced a newspaper entitled Der Gerade Weg (The Straight Path) which put forward its anti-Nazi perspective and severely criticised the theories of National Socialism. On May 14 1937 the Pope finally spoke out against Nazism, publishing 'Mit brennender Sorge' (With Burning Anxiety). Opposition of the Catholic Church also took on a different dimension, as many of its leaders spoke out publicly against the Nazi regime from their pulpits. The priest Faulhaber was well known for the practice of condemning the Nazis in his sermons, copies of which were distributed in many German Catholic Churches. He also wrote letters to Nazi Party officials in which, among other things, he protested the closure of Catholic schools and the abolition of the Catholic Young Men's and Young Women's Association.
The greatest shortcoming of the Catholic Church was that it did not move past passive resistance, and that it often failed to encourage its followers to resist. Also, while the Catholic Church publicly protested the closure of its schools and organisations, it failed to condemn many other aspects of the Nazi regime. Given its 30 million members in Germany and the fact that even during World War II the Nazi Party still did not feel confident it could 'risk complete destruction of the churches,' it can be assessed that the Catholic Church was surely in a position to be able to resist the Nazi dictatorship to a much greater extent than it did. Clear evidence of this is that in 1936 the Catholic Church successfully used collective action to resist the Nazi decision to replace the crucifix with the swastika in northern Germany. Why was this approach not applied to the implementation of other Nazi policies?
The officers of the German army were overwhelmingly supporters of the Nazi regime until it became known to them that Hitler was planning a war. At this point certain officers, most notably Colonel-General Beck, became opposed to the dictatorship and resolved to overthrow it through a military coup. Rothfels describes the conference that took place on November 5 1937, in which Hitler made it clear he intended 'to settle the question of German 'living-space' by force.' Beck and other officers here raised their objections, and Beck continued to do so after the meeting through several letters to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch. Rothfels indicates that Beck's original plan was to organise 'a unanimous refusal by Army leaders to take part in Hitler's war project.' This was the closest the army officers opposed to Hitler's war came to using collective action as a tactic, or even trying to involve more than a handful of people.
Therein lies the fundamental weakness of the army's resistance to Hitler. They determined to form a conspiracy against Hitler involving only a minority of people and to overthrow him by force, then presumably installing a military dictatorship. Also, it was only the prospect of a European war that the army officers were opposed to, not any of the other aspects of Nazism, leaving them unable to form ties with the other forces opposing the regime at that time. It is only the later assassination plot of July 1944 that attributes to the army officers a notable place in history. In the early stages of resistance, they played a very insignificant role.
Rothfels refers to some 'outstanding individuals who started to resist in the initial stage' in the civil service. Thus, as with the opposition to Nazism of the army, that offered by the civil service was limited to only several notable individuals and did not seek to involve masses of people. Carl Friedrich Goerdeler was a central figure among the resistance of the conservatives. He sought to achieve collaboration between those opposed to National Socialism in and outside Germany, as well as to extend the German opposition networks, in particular among those involved in the civil service and business sectors.
In 1938, once Hitler's plans for war became widely known, conservative opposition leaders including Goerdeler established contact with the governments of European powers, principally Great Britain 'specifically to begin negotiating for recognition of a new government to be installed after Hitler's removal.' Stern estimates that these conservatives were in a similar position to the socialists and Communists, as 'they failed to understand... the nature of the hostility the regime had unloosed in the West as well as in Russia.' He believes it was a mistake to believe that separate negotiations with the West would be successful. It is significant that the political thinking of the conservatives headed by Goerdeler was not in complete opposition to that of the Nazi Party. Stern emphases the fact that 'in one important respect at least their war-aims were identical with those of Hitler's regime.' One can hardly wage an insurmountable struggle against a regime with which one has such significant viewpoints in common.
The liberal sections of society offered a resistance to the rise of the Nazi Party that was barely visible. Hoffman speaks of individuals who 'offered resistance simply by refusing to fly the swastika flag on the prescribed days, by suddenly turning into ardent church-goers, or by studiously failing to hear the of the cry 'Heil Hitler.' The only form into which the liberals organised themselves was the German Freedom Party that was founded over the years of 1937-1938. Rothfels notes that 'their first pamphlet stressed 'the dignity human personality' as the rallying point of all opponents of the Nazi regime. Liberalism itself engenders reformism and individualism, and in this way the problems of the liberal resistance have a great deal in common with the weaknesses of the opposition provided by the Social Democratic Party as well as the conservatives.
Only an ongoing movement involving massive numbers of the working class and demanding, without compromise, the complete destruction of National Socialism could have stopped the Nazi Party from coming to power in Germany. Clearly neither the German Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Catholic Church, the army, the conservative opponents in the civil service nor the liberal elements of society were able to organise and maintain such a movement. The failure of these sections of society to successfully oppose Nazism can be attributed to their lack of understanding of the danger that National Socialism posed, their focus on the role of individuals instead of the masses of people, their inability to withstand Nazi repression, and their unwillingness, or inability, to work together.
